Conf: Contents of Consciousness

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: Jonathan Farrell <jfpttc@yahoo.com>
Subject: Call for abstracts ‘The Contents of Consciousness’ Manchester, UK 20–21 July, 2015

 

CALL FOR ABSTRACTS

Workshop: The Contents of Consciousness

Organised by the Architecture of Consciousness project, the University of Manchester

Date: 20–21 July, 2015

Submission deadline: 27 March 2015

The Contents of Consciousness workshop will explore issues pertaining to the admissible contents of phenomenal consciousness. One set of issues concerns the debate between those who hold that only ‘low-level’ properties (such as colour, shape, and texture) can figure in the contents of perceptual experience and those who hold that ‘high-level’ properties (such as being a wombat, being morally permissible, or being a rural scene) can also figure in the contents of perceptual consciousness. Is there any principled way of drawing the contrast between ‘low-level’ and ‘high level’ properties? How might empirical considerations be brought to bear on this debate? Is the debate a genuine one, or are discussants talking past one another, perhaps because of differences in how they interpret the terms employed in the debate? Another set of issues concerns the ways in which features might need to be integrated with each other in order to figure in phenomenal consciousness. Can features enter phenomenal consciousness without being bound together, or is a certain kind of binding a prerequisite of phenomenal admissibility? A third set of issues concerns ways in which accounts of the admissible contents of consciousness might constrain theories of consciousness. Might an account of the contents of consciousness contain clues as to the nature of consciousness? We invite submissions addressing any of these or related questions.

The organisers invite proposals for short presentations (10mins + 5mins Q&A) in which speakers can introduce their work on issues surrounding the contents of consciousness. Abstracts of no more than 500 words suitable for anonymous review should be sent to archofcon@gmail.com by 27th March 2015. Applicants are welcome from all relevant disciplines including (but not limited to) philosophy, cognitive psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience and artificial intelligence. Submissions from graduate students and early- career researchers are particularly welcome. To find out more about the project please visit our webpage at archofcon.wix.com/archofcon and to keep up with future news join our Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/archofcon?ref=hl

Invited speakers:
Farid Masrour
Myrto Mylopoulos
Jeff Speaks
David Whitney
Helen Yetter-Chappell

The Contents of Consciousness is the second in a series of workshops held in connection with the University of Manchester’s Architecture of Consciousness project. Funded by the European Research Council (ERC), this project is directed by Prof. Tim Bayne and aims to develop a model of the structural features of consciousness.

 

Conf: The Contents of Consciousness

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: Jonathan Farrell <jfpttc@yahoo.com>
Subject: Call for abstracts ‘The Contents of Consciousness’ Manchester, UK 20–21 July, 2015

 

CALL FOR ABSTRACTS

Workshop: The Contents of Consciousness

Organised by the Architecture of Consciousness project, the University of Manchester

Date: 20–21 July, 2015

Submission deadline: 27 March 2015

The Contents of Consciousness workshop will explore issues pertaining to the admissible contents of phenomenal consciousness. One set of issues concerns the debate between those who hold that only ‘low-level’ properties (such as colour, shape, and texture) can figure in the contents of perceptual experience and those who hold that ‘high-level’ properties (such as being a wombat, being morally permissible, or being a rural scene) can also figure in the contents of perceptual consciousness. Is there any principled way of drawing the contrast between ‘low-level’ and ‘high level’ properties? How might empirical considerations be brought to bear on this debate? Is the debate a genuine one, or are discussants talking past one another, perhaps because of differences in how they interpret the terms employed in the debate? Another set of issues concerns the ways in which features might need to be integrated with each other in order to figure in phenomenal consciousness. Can features enter phenomenal consciousness without being bound together, or is a certain kind of binding a prerequisite of phenomenal admissibility? A third set of issues concerns ways in which accounts of the admissible contents of consciousness might constrain theories of consciousness. Might an account of the contents of consciousness contain clues as to the nature of consciousness? We invite submissions addressing any of these or related questions.

The organisers invite proposals for short presentations (10mins + 5mins Q&A) in which speakers can introduce their work on issues surrounding the contents of consciousness. Abstracts of no more than 500 words suitable for anonymous review should be sent to archofcon@gmail.com by 27th March 2015. Applicants are welcome from all relevant disciplines including (but not limited to) philosophy, cognitive psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience and artificial intelligence. Submissions from graduate students and early- career researchers are particularly welcome. To find out more about the project please visit our webpage at archofcon.wix.com/archofcon and to keep up with future news join our Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/archofcon?ref=hl

Invited speakers:
Farid Masrour
Myrto Mylopoulos
Jeff Speaks
David Whitney
Helen Yetter-Chappell

The Contents of Consciousness is the second in a series of workshops held in connection with the University of Manchester’s Architecture of Consciousness project. Funded by the European Research Council (ERC), this project is directed by Prof. Tim Bayne and aims to develop a model of the structural features of consciousness.

 

Conf: Knowledge, Morality and Spirituality

International and Interdisciplinary Conference
 
Knowledge, Morality and Spirituality
 
Kolkata, INDIA
 
6-8 January 2016
 
 
Sponsored and Directed by
 
 
Call for Abstracts
 
Abstracts: 150 words
 
Deadline: 2 May 2015
 
Submit abstracts to the Conference Director,
Dr. Chandana Chakrabarti at chandanachak@gmail.com
also send a copy to iccsaexchange@gmail.com
 
Acceptance of proposal will be mailed within 2 weeks or earlier to participants
 
 
Subtopics:
 
Knowledge, Appearance and Reality, Knowing and Being, Justification of Knowledge, Knowledge and Existence, Realism and Idealism, Knowledge and Consciousness, Knowledge and Morality, Knowledge and Virtue, Virtue as Knowledge, Self and Morality, Collective Responsibility, Morality: Individual and Society, Death of God, God and Individual Self, Monism, Monotheism and Atheism, New Age Religions; Etc.
 
Subtopics are suggestive only. Conference organizers are open to other relevant topics addressing the theme.
 
 
 
Advisory Board Members:
 
Yolanda Espina (Portugal), Tommi Lehtonen (Finland), Asha Mukherjee (India), Debkumar Mukhopadhyya (India), Deven Patel (USA), Nina Petek (Slovenia), Ming Shao (China), Su Chen Wu (Taiwan), Yanling Xu (China)
 
Scholars from different corners of the world join our conferences.
 
The Cambridge Scholars Press has published seven books co-edited by members of our advisory board from selected papers from our last conferences. We also publish papers in our Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion if the theme of the paper is in the area of publication of the Journal.
 

Conf: Kentucky Philosophical Association

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: Matthew Pianalto <matthew.pianalto@gmail.com>
Subject: CFA: Kentucky Philosophical Association Summer Workshop

 

Call for Abstracts: KPA Summer Workshop

Kentucky Philosophical Association (KPA)
Summer 2015 Workshop
July 23-24, 2015
Hosted at Centre College, Danville, KY

Submissions deadline May 15, 2015

The KPA invites the submission of abstracts for papers (4,000-7,000 words) on any topic in philosophy. We invite faculty, graduate students, and independent scholars to share in the opportunity to present and discuss their current work.

Abstracts should be 150 words or less. A draft of the accepted paper will be due by July 10, 2015 and distributed among the participants. Each participant will have 80 minutes for their work, which includes an overview of the paper and discussion.

Please email submissions to Eva Cadavid at eva.cadavid@centre.edu with the subject line “KPA 2015 workshop abstract”. Include in the email the following information:

1. Title of paper
2. 150-word abstract (attached as a pdf)
3. Author’s name
4. Author’s institutional affiliation (if applicable)
5. Author’s email address
6. Indication whether campus housing will be necessary

Note: Campus housing will be available at the cost of $20/night. Registration fee for the workshop is $50 and covers continental breakfast and boxed lunches for both days.

http://kentuckyphilosophy.blogspot.com/2015/02/call-for-abstracts-kpa-summer-workshop.html

***
Matt Pianalto
KPA Vice President
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Eastern Kentucky University

 

CfP: Value and Agency

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: EJ Coffman <ejcoffman@gmail.com>
Subject: Call for Abstracts // Tennessee Value & Agency Conference 2015: Knowledge & Agency
Call for Abstracts

Fourth Annual Tennessee Value and Agency (TVA) Conference

September 4-5, 2015 // The University of Tennessee-Knoxville

Theme: Knowledge and Agency

Keynote Speakers: Candace Vogler (David B. and Clara E. Stern Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago) and John Schwenkler (Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University)

Abstracts (of 2-3 double-spaced pages, prepared for blind review) due by May 15, 2015 by e-mail to EJ Coffman (ecoffma1@utk.edu)

Much important and influential recent work in analytic philosophy lies at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of action and explores some or other of the following broad questions:

- Are action-theoretic concepts central to the nature of knowledge?
- What must you know in order to act (rationally, intentionally, freely, accountably)?
- How can you know about what you do (rationally, intentionally, freely, accountably)?

Abstracts that engage these and allied questions concerning the relationships among knowledge and agency will be considered for the 2015 TVA Conference. Sessions will be 75 minutes long, with roughly 40 minutes for the presentation and 35 minutes for group discussion.

We aim to notify authors of selected abstracts by June 1, 2015. If your abstract is selected and childcare duties render your attendance difficult, conference organizers will try to find a way for your childcare needs to be met.

The TVA conference (http://web.utk.edu/~philosop/TVA/conference.html) is an annual event aimed at encouraging philosophical conversation about topics pursued by established research clusters at the University of Tennessee Department of Philosophy.

 

CfP: Journal of Cognitive Science

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: Piccinini, Gualtiero <piccininig@umsl.edu>
Subject: CFP: Journal of Cognitive Science

 

The Journal of Cognitive Science is an official journal of the International Association for Cognitive Science (IACS, http://ia-cs.org). Its main concern is to showcase research articles of highest quality and significance within the disciplines of cognitive science, including, but not limited to, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, aesthetics, anthropology, and education, insofar as it is deemed to be of interest to those who pursue the study of mind. In particular, we would like to encourage submissions that cross the traditional disciplinary boundaries.

Gualtiero Piccinini, Philosophy Editor of the Journal of Cognitive Science
Department of Philosophy, Center for Neurodynamics
University of Missouri – St. Louis

http://www.umsl.edu/~piccininig/

http://philosophyofbrains.com/

 

CfP: The Character of Physicalism

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: Andreas Elpidorou <andreaselpidorou@gmail.com>
Subject: CFP: Topoi: The Character of Physicalism

CALL FOR PAPERS

“The Character of Physicalism”
Special Issue of Topoi

Guest Editor
Andreas Elpidorou
Department of Philosophy
University of Louisville
andreas.elpidorou@louisville

Not many issues in philosophy can be said to match, let alone to rival, physicalism’s importance, persistent influence, and divisiveness. Physicalism is typically understood to be an a posteriori, contingent, metaphysical thesis about the nature of our world. The acceptance of physicalism commits one to the acceptance of a monistic worldview. Despite how different or variegated existing entities or properties might appear to be, everything that exists in our world, according to physicalism, is physical. Physicalism also settles our place in nature. Qua physical beings, we are of the same kind as everything else. Whatever we might consider to be unique about us, is, or reduces to the, physical. The monistic and perhaps austere picture that physicalism offers does not meet universal acceptance. Given the scope and importance of physicalism, that much is to be expected.

Yet the debate surrounding the veracity of physicaism is not the only debate that concerns physicalism. A related and equally important debate concerns the nature and character of physicalism. Precisely what is the thesis of physicalism? How should it be defined? What are its commitments? What needs to be true in order for physicalism to be true? All of the aforementioned questions are questions that need to be answered. Perhaps they need to be answered even before one can ask whether physicalism is true. Yet no consensus has been reached on any of these questions. The question ‘What is physicalism?’ is in need of an answer just as much as the question ‘Is physicalism true?’

The aim of this special issue is to provide a forum in which a number of original essays can come together in order to contribute to our understanding of the nature and character of physicalism.

Three questions will be of particular importance to the special issue. First, physicalism holds that all that exists in our world is physical. But what exactly does ‘physical’ mean? How can one provide a definition of the term ‘physical’ that captures the spirit of physicalism? Second, physicalism is more than just a thesis about what type of properties or entities actually exist. Physicalism is also committed to the view that one set of properties (i.e., physical properties) determines all others. Thus, in order to explicate the nature of physicalism, one needs to specify the nature of this determination. Finally, what sort of commitments does physicalism have? For instance, does physicalism entail the truth of microphysicalism? Does physicalism entail that all truths can be a priori deduced from physical truths? Making explicit the commitments of physicalism matters, for only by making such commitments explicit can one clearly understand physicalism’s scope and strength.

Other suggested topics for the special issue include, but are not limited to the following:

· An examination of realization physicalism and its commitments

· The relationship between supervenience and explanation

· The via negativa approach to physicalism

· The merits and demerits of theory definitions of ‘physical’

· Other less traditional approaches in defining ‘physical’

· The relationship between microphysicalism and physicalism

· The role of Hume’s dictum in physicalism

· Grounding and physicalism

· The relationship between physicalism and scientific findings or practices
Please note: The special issue is not interested in publishing articles that examine arguments for or against physicalism. The focus of the special issue is not on whether physicalism is true but rather on how to properly explicate the thesis and commitments of physicalism.

*Submission information*

Word limit: 7000 words

Deadline for submissions: October 15, 2015

Confirmed Invited Contributors
Andrew Melnyk (University of Missouri); Barbara Montero (Graduate Center, CUNY); Jessica Wilson (University of Toronto); Gene Witmer (University of Florida)

Peer review: all submissions will be subject to a double anonymous peer-review process. Please prepare your submission for anonymous reviewing.

Submissions should be made directly to the journal’s online submission website
(http://www.editorialmanager.com/topo) indicating special issue “The Character of Physicalism.”

For further details, please check the website of Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy: http://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/11245

For any further questions regarding the special issue please contact Andreas Elpidorou at andreas.elpidorou@louisville.edu

CfP: Neuroscience and Its Philosophy

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: Piccinini, Gualtiero <piccininig@umsl.edu>
Subject: CFP: Synthese Special Issue on Neuroscience and Its Philosophy

The journal Synthese publishes a yearly issue on the Philosophy of Neuroscience bo. In recent years, this has been perhaps the highest profile venue explicitly devoted to articles in the philosophy of neuroscience.

Submissions are accepted on an ongoing basis. Accepted papers will appear in the next special issue. In order to be processed on time for the 2015 issue, papers should be submitted by May 2015, but there is no strict deadline.

Anyone doing good work in the philosophy of neuroscience should consider submitting their papers to Synthese’s yearly issue on Neuroscience and Its Philosophy. An explicit option Neuroscience and Its Philosophy is available in Editorial Manager (Synthese’s online submission system).
Contact: Gualtiero Piccinini (piccininig@umsl.edu)

http://link.springer.com/journal/11229

Gualtiero Piccinini

Department of Philosophy, Center for Neurodynamics

University of Missouri – St. Louis

http://www.umsl.edu/~piccininig/

http://philosophyofbrains.com/

 

CfP: Consciousness and Inner Awareness

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: Jonathan Farrell <jfpttc@yahoo.com>
Subject: CFP: ‘Consciousness and Inner Awareness’ Special Issue of The Review of Philosophy and Psychology

CALL FOR PAPERS

Consciousness and Inner Awareness Special Issue of The Review of Philosophy and Psychology

It is generally agreed that consciousness provides subjects with an ‘outer awareness’ of their environment. More controversial is the claim that consciousness also provides subjects with an ‘inner awareness’ of their own conscious experience. Understanding the relationship between consciousness and inner awareness has increasingly been recognised as a crucial target for consciousness research. Submissions are invited for a Thematic Issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology on the subject of consciousness and inner awareness.

Possible topics include, though are not limited to, the following:

1. Inner Awareness as Essential to Consciousness Do we always have an inner awareness of our concurrent conscious state? Are there good reasons to believe that inner awareness is essential to consciousness rather than a contingent feature of our experiences? How exactly should inner awareness be characterised and what is its relationship with outer awareness? Is inner awareness a representational relation, and what would this mean for the representational structure of experience?

2. The Sense of Mineness as Essential to Inner Awareness When we are aware of our concurrent experience, are we aware of it as our own? Are there good reasons to believe that this ‘sense of mineness’ is an essential feature of inner awareness? What exactly is the sense of mineness and how does it figure in experience? What is the relationship between the phenomenology of experiential ownership, of bodily ownership and of agential ownership?

3. Inner Awareness and Disorders of Consciousness What can disorders of experience teach us about the relationship between consciousness and inner awareness? For instance, should ‘blindsight’ subjects be regarded as having conscious visual experiences without an inner awareness of that experience

Guest Editors Dr Tom McClelland (University of Manchester) Dr Jonathan Farrell (University of Manchester) Invited Contributors Prof. Uriah Kriegel (Institut Jean Nicod) Dr. Nick Medford (University of Sussex) Prof. Morten Overgaard (Aarhus University and Aalborg University) Prof. Martine Nida-Rümelin (University of Friborg) Schedule Submission Deadline: May 1st 2015

How to submit Prospective authors should register at: http://www.editorialmanager. com/ropp to obtain a login and select “Consciousness and Inner Awareness” as an article type. Manuscripts should be approximately 8,000 words. Submissions should follow the author guidelines available on the journal’s website http://www.springer.com/ philosophy/journal/13164.

Contact For any queries, please email: jonathan.farrell@manchester. ac.uk

 

CfP: Consciousness and Inner Awareness

———- Forwarded message ———-
From: Jonathan Farrell <jfpttc@yahoo.com>
Subject: CFP: ‘Consciousness and Inner Awareness’ Special Issue of The Review of Philosophy and Psychology

 

CALL FOR PAPERS

Consciousness and Inner Awareness

Special Issue of The Review of Philosophy and Psychology

It is generally agreed that consciousness provides subjects with an ‘outer awareness’ of their environment. More controversial is the claim that consciousness also provides subjects with an ‘inner awareness’ of their own conscious experience. Understanding the relationship between consciousness and inner awareness has increasingly been recognised as a crucial target for consciousness research. Submissions are invited for a Thematic Issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology on the subject of consciousness and inner awareness. Possible topics include, though are not limited to, the following:

1. Inner Awareness as Essential to Consciousness
Do we always have an inner awareness of our concurrent conscious state? Are there good reasons to believe that inner awareness is essential to consciousness rather than a contingent feature of our experiences? How exactly should inner awareness be characterised and what is its relationship with outer awareness? Is inner awareness a representational relation, and what would this mean for the representational structure of experience?

2. The Sense of Mineness as Essential to Inner Awareness
When we are aware of our concurrent experience, are we aware of it as our own? Are there good reasons to believe that this ‘sense of mineness’ is an essential feature of inner awareness? What exactly is the sense of mineness and how does it figure in experience? What is the relationship between the phenomenology of experiential ownership, of bodily ownership and of agential ownership?

3. Inner Awareness and Disorders of Consciousness
What can disorders of experience teach us about the relationship between consciousness and inner awareness? For instance, should ‘blindsight’ subjects be regarded as having conscious visual experiences without an inner awareness of that experience?

Guest Editors
Dr Tom McClelland (University of Manchester)
Dr Jonathan Farrell (University of Manchester)

Invited Contributors
Prof. Uriah Kriegel (Institut Jean Nicod)
Dr. Nick Medford (University of Sussex)
Prof. Morten Overgaard (Aarhus University and Aalborg University)
Prof. Martine Nida-Rümelin (University of Friborg)
Schedule
Submission Deadline: May 1st 2015
How to submit
Prospective authors should register at: http://www.editorialmanager. com/ropp to obtain a login and select “Consciousness and Inner Awareness” as an article type. Manuscripts should be approximately 8,000 words. Submissions should follow the author guidelines available on the journal’s website http://www.springer.com/ philosophy/journal/13164.
Contact
For any queries, please email: jonathan.farrell@manchester. ac.uk

 

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