The myth of Jones strikes back

Dear WSS friends, Two papers deserving great attention: 1. On philosophy of mind, by one the very best Sellars’ scholars : James R. O’Shea, “The ‘theory theory’ of mind and the aims of Sellars’ original myth of Jones”, forthcoming in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Abstract: http://www.springerlink.com/content/mm88rgw444x77423/ 2. On theory of knowledge (coherentism) : Bruce Russell, [...]

Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference 2012

The 2012 AAP Conference is being hosted by the Philosophy Program at the University of Wollongong, from July 1st to July 6th. This conference is designed to give professional philosophers and philosophy students the opportunity to present and discuss papers in all areas of philosophy. Each year it attracts around 300 philosophers worldwide. To submit [...]

The Rudolf Carnap Lectures 2012

The Rudolf Carnap Lectures are an annual event of the Institute of Philosophy at Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany. Attached to the lecture series is a graduate workshop, also held annually, where graduate students present papers on topics related to the topics of the lectures. This year the topic of the lectures is ‘Attention and Concepts’ and [...]

Calls for Papers / Continental Europe

• The Relevance of American Philosophy: The Nordic Pragmatism Network and the Associazione Pragma (Italy) organize the First European Pragmatism Conference in Rome, The Relevance of American Philosophy, Italy, 19-21 September 2012. The purpose of the conference is to bring together different scholars working on the tradition of pragmatism and American philosophy. The deadline for [...]

Sellarsian Particulars

Here is a new paper on a sellarsian ontological theme: nominalism Sellarsian Particulars Matteo Morganti Acta Anal DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0145-x Abstract: In this article, a critical assessment is carried out of the two available forms of nominalism with respect to the ontological constitution of material objects: resemblance nominalism and trope theory. It is argued that these two nominalistic ontologies [...]

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